The Working Paper series presents reports on matters in the sphere of activities of the Riksbank that are considered to be of interest to a wider public. The papers are to be regarded as reports on ongoing studies and the authors will be pleased to receive comments.
Introduction
It is a stylised fact that the empirical fit of an estimated monetary policy reaction function improves considerably when a lagged interest rate is included. There is less agreement on how this finding should be interpreted, however. The traditional explanation is that it reflects policy inertia, i.e. that the central bank for one reason or another chooses only to gradually adjust the interest rate towards the desired level (given by the original Taylor rule).
This view has been challenged in recent years, notably by Rudebusch (2002) , who argues that the large and significant coefficient on the lagged interest rate is the result of a misspecified representation of monetary policy. More specifically, he proposes that the reason why the Fed chooses to smooth interest rates is that it reacts to some serially correlated variable(s) that is incorrectly omitted from the reaction function. The significance of the lagged interest rate might therefore be spurious and should not be regarded as support for policy inertia.
The relative importance of policy inertia and omitted variables has been investigated in a number of recent studies (e.g., Castelnuovo, 2003 , English et al., 2003 , Gerlach-Kristen, 2004 ), most of which conclude that both mechanisms are at play simultaneously. However, relatively few papers have so far tried to investigate empirically what the omitted variable actually represents. A notable exception is Gerlach-Kristen (2004) (hereafter GK), who estimates the omitted variable as an unobserved component within a model that nests the two hypotheses. Since the estimated series turns out to be rather closely related to a risk premium on corporate bonds, GK concludes that interest-rate smoothing, in part, is likely to be a result of concerns for financial market conditions. In this paper we propose an alternative, equally plausible interpretation of the omitted variable, namely as a "measurement error" in the output gap. The measurement error arises because the Fed's real-time assessment of the output gap differs from the gap that is obtained from official sources. 
Empirical analysis
We use quarterly US data on the federal funds rate (i), inflation (π), and the output gap (y) The model analysed by GK is:
where z is an unobserved component, and η and u mutually and serially uncorrelated white Table 1 re-estimates 1 For a normative rather than positive analysis of the importance for monetary policy of measurement errors in the output gap, see Smets (2002) . 2 Without the restriction on the variance of η the policy shocks would follow an MA(1) process and thus not be white noise.
her model using our updated data. As can be seen, the estimates of ρ, φ, and the variance of η are all significant at the 1% test level, implying that both policy inertia and an omitted variable are important in explaining interest-rate smoothing. Interestingly, the estimate of ρ is lower than in the case of OLS estimation of (1) subject to 0 = γ , in which case the estimate is 0.811.
3 Perhaps the most interesting finding is that the estimates of the unobservable z turn out to be rather closely related to a risk spread that measures the difference between the yields on a safe and risky bond (Fig. 1) . 4 From this, GK concludes that interest-rate smoothing, in part, is likely to be a result of concerns for financial market conditions.
In this paper we propose an alternative, equally plausible interpretation of the unobservable z variable. We consider the following generalised unobserved-components (UC) model: The estimates of the UC model (3)-(6) appear in the second column of Table 1 . All parameter estimates are highly significant and economically reasonable. It is interesting to note that the estimate of ρ is lower than in the GK model. 5 Also, the 2 R associated with the prediction errors of the federal funds rate is slightly higher for system (3)-(6) than for system
(1)-(2) (0.824 compared to 0.809).
The evidence in Table 2 further strengthens the case for our generalised UC model. This table shows that the adjusted output gap ỹ has a higher (and statistically more precise) correlation with inflation than the standard CBO gap measure. Adjusting y for z thus seems to generate a measure of resource utilisation that better reflects actual capacity constraints in the economy.
Another piece of evidence may be the real-time statements made by the Fed. Of course, the Fed does not base its policy on any explicit measure of the output gap and the evidence therefore is anecdotal. Nevertheless, in periods when the two output gap estimates are qualitatively different, it may be possible to find some evidence in the minutes of the FOMC that allows us to judge whether one estimate is preferable to the other. In our sample, such a period occurs during 1994-1997, where the adjusted output gap ỹ is positive while the CBO gap is negative (Fig. 2) . The following two quotations are from the minutes of the FOMC in Obviously, such statements square better with an output gap that is positive rather than negative.
Finally, Fig. 3 documents the differences between the estimates of z from models (3)- (6) and (1)- (2). Evidently, the policy implications of the two estimates are occasionally quite different.
Conclusion
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